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INTRODUCTION 
The Judges have failed to carry their burden of showing that summary judgment was 
properly granted in these cases. They insist that Mr. Estes' claims are barred by Utah's 
Governmental Immunity Act, but overlook the plain meaning of the statute and this Coin t's 
decisions regarding how the notice-of-claim provisions must be construed. They continue to rely 
on the statute of limitations, but have not addressed Mr. Estes' arguments concerning the lack of 
an adequate record to support the district courts' rulings on this issue. They attempt to rely on 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel and, for the very first time, argue that Mr. Estes' claims are 
barreu r>\ ,nu j ^ i ; me of res judicata. Neither doctrine applies. Both the issues and the claims 
asserted in this case have been asserted for the first time, and the prior federal litigation raised 
entirely different claims. Finally, Mr. Estes' complaints each state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted, and the Judges' arguments do not adequately address these substantive claims. Mr. 
Estes respectfully requests that the orders of the district court be reversed and that these matters 
be remanded to those courts for trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH GOVERNMENT AL IMMUNITY \C r DOES NOT APPL1! I'f * MR. 
ESTES' CLAIM. 
The Judges raise two arguments to support their claim that the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act (the ' '""Act") bai 3 Mr. Estes' claims. First. thc\ .--.r' \\\ -IA- :I incorporates two 
different notice requirements, one applicable to "a claim for injury against a governmental 
entity," Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (emphasis added), and another that applies to "[a] claim 
1 
against" a governmental entity, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(5) (emphasis added). Second, they 
argue that Mr. Estes' forfeiture action under section 78-35-1 is, in reality, a claim for "personal 
injury." Neither argument can be supported by the Act or the decisions interpreting it. 
A. The Notice-of-Claim Provisions Do Not Apply to These Claims. 
In his opening brief, Mr. Estes argued that the Act's notice-of-claim requirement does not 
apply in these cases because his suits under section 78-35-1 are not claims for "injury" as that 
term is defined in the Act. See Br. of Appellant, at 11-12. The Act's notice-of-claim provision, 
section 63-30-11(2), states in relevant part that "[a]ny person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity, or against an employee for an act or omission occurring during the 
performance of his duties . . . shall file a written notice of claim " In response, the Judges 
cite the section immediately following section 63-30-11, and argue that a notice of claim also 
must be provided for "a claim against the state, or against it employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of his duties " Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12. In effect, the 
Judges argue that there are two different notice-of-claim requirements, governed by two different 
standards (the latter of which is not specified in the Act), and presumably with different 
consequences. 
The Act's notice-of-claim provisions, sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, and 63-30-13, must 
be read together. See Field v. Boyer Company. L.C.. 952 P.2d 1078, 1085 (Utah 1998) ("a 
statute should be construed as a comprehensive whole, not in a piecemeal fashion"). Section 63-
30-11 sets forth the substantive requirements of a notice of claim, and the two following sections 
2 
specify which persons and entities must receive a copy of the notice. According to the Utah 
Court of Appeals: 
[S]ome initial guiding principles are clear. First, the Governmental Immunity Act 
requires that "[a]ny person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity 
. . . shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an 
action." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2).... Second, this notice of claim must be 
filed with the correct persons or entities. See icL §§ 63-30-12, -13 (1993). 
Bellonio v. Salt Lake Citv Corporation. 911 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing Yates 
v. Vernal Family Health Ctr.. 617 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1980) and Lamarr v. Utah State 
Department of Transp.. 828 P.2d 535, 540-41 (Utah App. 1992)). 
Furthermore, section 63-30-12 and 63-30-13 each provide in their respective titles, that 
they deal with the "[t]ime for filing notice" against the state or its employees (section 63-30-12) 
and the "[t]ime for filing notice" against a political subdivision or its employees (section 63-30-
13). Both sections require a claimant to file within one year, however, the sections differ as to 
who or which agency must receive a copy of the notice.1 Thus, if the Act is read as a whole, and 
given a reasonable construction, the substantive requirements of section 63-30-11(2), as well as 
the filing requirements of sections 63-30-12 and 60-30-13 must be satisfied. 
It is unreasonable, and contrary to the Act's plain language, to read it otherwise. If the 
Judges interpretation were accepted, there would be two different notice-of-claim requirements. 
Section 63-30-11 sets forth exactly what the notice must contain, who must sign it, and the 
1
 Under section 63-30-12, the notice must be filed with the "attorney general and the 
agency concerned." Under section 63-30-13, the notice must be filed "with the governing body 
of the political subdivision." 
3 
manner in which it must be delivered. Under the reading proposed by the Judges, litigants would 
be left to guess what is required for a notice of claim under sections 63-30-12 and -13. Such an 
expansive reading of section 63-30-12 and -13 would, in addition, swallow section 63-30-11, and 
render that provision meaningless.2 
B. These Cases Are Not Personal Injury Actions. 
While acknowledging that Mr. Estes' claims under section 78-35-1 are "forfeiture 
actions," Appellee Br. at 11, the Judges nevertheless argue that these claims are, in reality, claims 
for "personal injury." The forfeiture statute, which establishes a $5,000 fine to be imposed 
regardless of individual circumstances, is not, by its terms, intended to compensate a plaintiff for 
personal injury. The Act defines "injury" as "death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of 
property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, that would be 
actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 (emphasis 
added). The emphasized portion of this section is significant — the Act contemplates personal 
injury as including claims that would otherwise be actionable. Because no one other than a judge 
may violate section 78-35-1, the conduct would not otherwise be actionable. Moreover, if the 
statute were intended to compensate for personal injury, it would allow recovery for damages in 
2
 The Judge's argument also would mean that actions under section 78-35-1, which 
specifically contemplate a monetary fine on judges, would be subject to governmental immunity. 
The Judge's acknowledge that section 78-35-1 predates the Governmental Immunity Act, and 
there is no reason to believe the Legislature intended to abolish, as a practical matter, section 78-
35-1 when enacting the Act. The forfeiture statute clearly contemplates a fine and there is no 
valid reason for saying that the fine cannot be recovered because the judicial officer is immune 
from suit. 
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tort. Claims under section 78-35-1 are not personal injury claims, and are not subject to the 
Governmental Immunity Act.3 
n . THE DISTRICT COURTS IMPROPERLY RULED THAT MR. ESTES' CLAIMS 
WERE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The district courts failed to address Mr. Estes' arguments concerning tolling of the statute 
of limitations, and the record does not permit this Court to make that determination for them. 
Mr. Estes argued below that the limitations period should have been tolled during the time he 
was in prison and during the pendency of the federal court action. Mr. Estes argued a number of 
factors that would support application of the "exceptional circumstances" exception to toll the 
running of the statute of limitations. None of the district courts made findings on this issue, and 
the Judge's have not met their burden of showing there are no disputed issues of material fact. 
Summary judgment is therefore inappropriate. 
Although the Judges correctly state the law applicable to tolling of the statute of 
limitations, they impermissibly seek to shift the burden to Mr. Estes in opposing the Judges' 
3
 Even if the claim were for personal injury, this Court has long recognized a common 
law exception to governmental immunity for equitable claims. See El Ranch Enterprises. Inc. v. 
Murray City Corp.. 565 P.2d 778, 779 (Utah 1977). Generally, an action for money damages was 
"the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law." Curtis v. Loether. 415 U.S. 189, 196 
(1974). However, the United States Supreme Court has provided that not all monetary relief 
must necessarily be legal relief. See id. The Supreme Court has recognized two attributes when 
characterizing a claim as equitable. First, damages are equitable where they are restitutionary, 
such as in "action[s] for disgorgement of improper profits." Tull v. United States. 481 U.S. 412, 
424 (1987). Second, monetary award "incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief may be 
equitable. Id at 424. While the remedy sought here is not injunctive, it is also not 
compensatory. The relief sought here is forfeiture or penalty for misuse of authority. Thus, if the 
Court finds that these actions are for "personal injury," it should recognize this common law 
exception to the Act for claims under section 78-35-1. 
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motions for summary judgment. The Judges had the burden of showing that there were no 
disputed issues of material fact, see In re West. 948 P.2d 351 (Utah 1997), and this Court must 
view all facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Estes. Hipwell v. IHC Hosp.. 944 P.2d 327, 328 
(Utah 1997). In the proceedings below, both the district courts and the Judges failed to address 
the factual and legal arguments raised by Mr. Estes concerning tolling the statute of limitations. 
The Judges offered no evidence, let alone undisputed evidence, that Mr. Estes was aware of all of 
the facts and had sufficient information to apprise him of the existence of the causes of action. 
Mr. Estes, for his part, attempted to address these factual and legal issues. For this reason, 
summary judgment was improper and the orders of the district courts should be reversed or, at 
minimum, these cases should be remanded to the district courts to make findings necessary to 
determine whether application of the "exception circumstances" exception is appropriate.4 
4
 Although the legislature has repealed the tolling statute applicable to incarceration, the 
legislature did not expressly provide that imprisonment will never allow tolling of a statute of 
limitations. Instead the amended statute provide, in relevant part: 
If a person entitled to bring an action . . . is at the time of the action accrued, either 
under the age of the majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal 
guardian, the time of the disability is not a part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36. "Tolling statutes based on mental incompetency are enacted to 
relieve from the strict time restrictions [on] people who are unable protect their legal rights 
because of an overall inability to function in society." O'Neal v. Division of Family Services. 
State of Utah. 821 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 1991). "Courts generally hold that a person is 
incompetent for the purposes of a provision tolling a statute of limitations 'when the disability is 
of such a nature to show him [or her] unable to manage his [or her] business affairs or estate, or 
to comprehend his [or her] legal rights or liabilities." Id. (emphasis added) (citing 51 Am. Jur. 2d 
Limitation of Actions § 187 (1970). In this case, the record has not been sufficiently developed 
to determine whether the disability statute may be applied to Mr. Estes' claims. 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURTS IMPROPERLY RULED THAT MR. ESTES' CLAIMS 
WERE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, does not apply because issues raised in the prior 
federal action were different than the issues raised in these case. Mr. Estes' federal court action 
did not allege claims against these defendants for violation of section 78-35-1, and there is some 
doubt whether such claims could have been raised in federal court. Instead, the federal action 
was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, and alleged a civil conspiracy 
involving a number of defendants, including the defendants named in these cases. [Tibbs R. 79-
80]. The federal court dismissed the claims, but for reasons wholly unrelated to the legal claims 
raised in these cases. [See Appellant's Br., Addendum, Report & Recommendation, at 38]. The 
federal court found, among other things, that Mr. Estes had not stated a claim for violation of 
section 1983 because his underlying conviction had not been invalidated, and had not stated a 
claim for violation of sections 1985 and 1986 because he had not alleged sufficient facts 
indicating a conspiracy among the defendants. [HJ. 
The Judges acknowledge that for collateral estoppel to apply, "'the party must show that 
the issue challenged in the case at hand is identical to the issue decided in the previous action.'" 
Appellee's Br. at 13 (citing Sew v. Security Title Co.. 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995)). The 
Judges also agree that the issue in the prior litigation "'must have been competently, fully, and 
fairly litigated.'" I i (citing Sevy, 902 P.2d at 634). See also Jones. Waldo. Holbrook & 
McDonough v. Dawson. 923 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Utah 1996) ("Issue preclusion arises in a second 
action on the basis of a prior decision when the same issue is involved in both actions; the issue 
7 
was actually litigated in the first action, after a full and fair opportunity for litigation, and the 
issues were actually decided by a sufficiently final and valid disposition on the merits." (citing 18 
Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practices and Procedure § 
4416 (1981)). The Judges cannot satisfy these requirements here. 
Whether the Judges violated section 78-35-1 was not at issue in the federal action, was 
not actually litigated, and obviously there was no determination on the merits. In addition, 
because this claim was not asserted, there was not a full and fair opportunity for Mr. Estes' 
claims to be heard. Therefore, the district courts improperly relied on the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel and these rulings should be reversed. 
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY. 
The Judges now raise, for the first time, the argument that Mr. Estes' claims are barred by 
res judicata, or claim preclusion. The Court should decline to entertain this argument because it 
was not raised below. See State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 355 (Utah 1996); American Coal Co. v. 
Sandstrom. 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984); L & M Corp. v. Loader, 688 P.2d 448, 449-50 (Utah 
1984). If the argument is considered, the Court should find that res judicata does not apply. 
A party may be precluded from bringing a subsequent claim if the following conditions 
are met: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is 
alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must be one that could 
and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a 
final judgment on the merits. 
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Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). Although the first and third requirements 
may be satisfied, it is undisputed that the claims alleged in this case were not presented in the 
first suit. Thus, the sole issue is whether Mr. Estes' section 78-35-1 claims "could and should 
have been raised in the first action." Id. 
The Judges have not ~ and cannot — demonstrate that the section 78-35-1 claims could 
and should have been brought in the federal action. Indeed, it is questionable whether such 
claims could have been heard by a federal court hearing a dispute involving a question of federal 
law. The claims would, at best, be permissive supplemental claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
These supplemental claims would be alleged against only a few of the defendants in the case, 
would be based upon a legal theory entirely different than the legal theory of the primary causes 
of action, and would present difficulties in proof and possibly inconsistent results. Moreover, the 
federal court could have dismissed the section 78-35-1 claims for lack of jurisdiction as soon as it 
dismissed the underlying sections 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 
Finally, the federal court likely would not have entertained such a claim in light of its 
conclusions regarding judicial immunity, an issue not raised in this case. Mr. Estes certainly was 
not required to bring these claims in the federal lawsuit, and his failure to do so cannot justifiably 
operate as res judicata on the claims asserted in this case. The Judges' untimely assertion of res 
judicata, or claim preclusion, should be rejected. 
V. MR. ESTES5 COMPLAINTS STATED CLAIMS UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY 
BE GRANTED. 
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The Judges argue Mr. Estes' complaints failed to state claims upon which relief may be 
granted for three reasons. First, they contend that section 78-35-1 only applies when a judge 
"summarily denies" a writ of habeas corpus and not when a judge considers a writ and denies the 
same. This reading, however, is contrary to the language and purpose of the statute. Second, 
they claim that the Judges' conduct in denying the writs was not "willful and wrongful." This 
argument, however, raises factual questions that preclude summary judgment. Third, the Judges 
assert that because all three of the challenged decisions were affirmed on appeal, there can be no 
violation of section 78-35-1. In at least some of the cases, however, the conduct giving rise to 
the alleged violation of section 78-35-1 was not considered by the appellate courts and cannot be 
relied upon to excuse a violation of the statute. 
A. Section 78-35-1 Applies Whenever a Judge Willfully and Wrongfully Refuses 
to Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
Section 78-35-1 states: 
Any judge, whether acting individually or as a member of a court, who wrongfully and 
willfully refuses to allow a writ of habeas corpus whenever proper application for the 
same has been made shall forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding $5,000 to the party thereby 
aggrieved. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35-1. The Judges argue that this statute should be read as applying only to 
judges who summarily deny a writ without considering its merits. The plain language of the 
statute, however, states that a violation occurs whenever a judge "refuses to allow a writ of 
habeas corpus whenever proper application for the same has been made." The Judges ask the 
Court to rewrite the statute to apply to a judge "who wrongfully and willfully refuse[s] to 
consider the merits, improperly dismissing the petition as frivolous." Appellee's Br. at 22. The 
10 
statute, however, is clear — a judge may be fined for the wrongful and willful denial of a writ 
which, under similar circumstances, should have been granted. 
In any event, the Judges never considered the merits of Mr. Estes' petitions. All were 
dismissed on motion before any responsive pleading was filed. All were dismissed with 
prejudice, and Mr. Estes was not given an opportunity to amend. From the record, it appears that 
he was not given an opportunity to even respond to the motion to dismiss in the Tibbs case. Rule 
65B requires that if a petition is not dismissed as frivolous on its face, which the Judges concede 
they were not, "the court shall . . . serve a copy of the petition . . . upon the respondent [and] [a]t 
the same time, the court may issue an order directing the respondent to answer otherwise respond 
to the petition." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(6) (1998); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(f)(3) (1988) 
("Upon filing the complaint the court shall issue a writ directed to the defendant commanding 
him to bring the person alleged to be restrained before the court . . . .") . There is no evidence in 
the record that the Judges satisfied the requirements of the rule. 
B. Mr. Estes' Complaints Alleged a Violation of Section 78-35-1. 
The Judges next contend that Mr. Estes failed to allege, in his complaints, that the judges 
acted willfully and wrongfully in denying the petitions. Each of Mr. Estes' petitions, however, 
alleged the factual basis for the claim and identified that he was seeking recovery of a fine 
pursuant to section 78-35-1. [See Tibbs R. 1-3; Rigtrup R. 1-3; Sawaya R. 1-2]. Basic pleading 
rules require nothing more. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a) ("A pleading which sets forth a claim for 
relief... shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled 
to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled."). It is 
11 
simply incorrect to say that "[n]o facts have been alleged other than that the petitions were 
denied." Appellee's Br. at 23. 
Whether the Judges conduct was "willful and wrongful" is a question of fact, not properly 
decided on a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g.. Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877, 880 
(Utah 1979) (whether defendant's conduct was "willful" was a question of fact, precluding 
summary judgment); Alford v. Utah League of Cities & Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (whether statement was published maliciously is generally a question of fact). The 
Judges have not carried their burden of showing that there are no disputed issues of material fact. 
Summary judgment was therefore improper. See In re West, 948 P.2d 351 (Utah 1997). 
C. Whether a Claim is Appealed is Irrelevant to Determining Violations of 
Section 78-35-1. 
The Judges final argument is that because all three petitions were appealed and affirmed, 
there cannot, as a matter of law, be a violation of section 78-35-1. This argument, however, fails 
to take into consideration what issues were actually appealed and whether the appellate courts 
ever considered the actions that Mr. Estes has alleged violate section 78-35-1. 
In the Tibbs case, for example, the district court dismissed Mr. Estes' petition for the sole 
reason that he had named as the defendant the acting warden of the Central Utah Correctional 
Facility. Estes v. Van Per Veur. 824 P.2d 1200, 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Court of 
Appeals held that the Board of Pardons, in addition to the warden, should have been named as 
defendants. LdL Following remand, Mr. Estes amended his writ to name the Board of Pardons, 
but when he attempted to file it, the district court informed him the Sixth Circuit Court, where he 
12 
originally filed this writ, no longer existed. Then, when Mr. Estes was able to locate the proper 
court to file the amended writ, the court refused to accept it without a filing fee or writ of 
impecuniosity, even though it was an amendment to his original writ, was identified by the same 
I I 
case number, and even though Utah law prohibits charging a filing fee. [Tibbs R. 1-3]. The 
Court of Appeals never had before it, and therefore never considered, any of the conduct that 
occurred after remand, yet this is the very conduct Mr. Estes contends violated section 78-35-1. 
In addition, in the Sawaya case, Mr. Estes contends that Judge Sawaya's reliance on Rule 4-501 
as a basis for dismissing his writ violated section 78-35-1. It is undisputed, however, that the 
court of appeals did not consider this issue on appeal. 
The blanket rule proposed by the Judges is unwarranted and unwise. Section 78-35-1 
imposes a statutory fine whenever a judge wrongfully and willfully refuses to allow a writ of 
habeas corpus when proper application for the same has been made. If a plaintiff can establish 
that a judge's conduct was wrongful and willful, nothing further should be required. By the plain 
I I 
terms of the statute, a violation of section 78-35-1 occurs upon refusal of the writ. Whether that 
decision is subsequently affirmed, or denied, makes no difference. Mr. Estes' respectfully 
I I 
requests that the Court reject the Judges' proposed imposition of an additional requirement to 
allege a violation of section 78-35-1. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellant respectfully requests that the orders entered by the 
district courts in each of these consolidated cases be reversed, and that the cases be remanded for 
trials on the merits. 
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I I S DATED this _*i!day of July, 1998. 
Todd Shaughnes 
Attorneys for Newton Estes 
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